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Note 
BEYOND TAXPAYERS’ SUITS: PUBLIC INTEREST STANDING IN THE 
STATES 
JOHN DIMANNO 
In the 2007 Term, the United States Supreme Court reinforced its narrow 
formulation of standing in public interest cases in Hein v. Freedom from Religion 
Foundation, Inc.  The case was yet another in a long line of Supreme Court cases 
that have denied public interest litigation on standing grounds in cases where a 
litigant—as taxpayer and/or citizen—seeks to vindicate the public interest by 
challenging an alleged government illegality.  As a consequence, the restrictive 
standing model in federal courts creates a number of circumstances in which a 
potential constitutional violation by the government may go unchallenged.  
Alternatively, many state courts have developed and successfully employed 
alternative standing models that allow citizens or taxpayers to sue on behalf of the 
public interest in cases involving issues of great constitutional importance.  These 
models—more liberal and discretionary than the federal model—demonstrate the 
state courts’ commitment to ensuring that constitutional limitations on 
governmental power are judicially enforced.  This Note will compare the federal 
standing model with the alternative public interest standing models developed in a 
group of select states, providing the first case study to focus on the extent to which 
states exercise approaches to the standing doctrine that diverge from the federal 
model.  This Note concludes that public interest standing models, though most 
likely unfit for federal courts, are appropriate in state courts, given the significant 
differences in constitutional background, governance structures, and historical 
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BEYOND TAXPAYERS’ SUITS: PUBLIC INTEREST STANDING IN THE 
STATES 
JOHN DIMANNO∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A fundamental question both federal and state courts have grappled 
with is who should have access to the judicial system.  This question is 
dealt with by the doctrine of standing.  Standing—along with such 
doctrines as mootness, ripeness, and political question—is a justiciability 
doctrine.  Justiciability doctrines determine whether, when, and by whom 
significant public questions ought to be adjudicated, and therefore directly 
affect issues such as government accountability, public involvement in 
issues of social significance, and the proper policymaking authority of 
government.1  The federal system of justiciability, in particular its doctrine 
of standing, has developed in part as a means of ensuring a proper 
separation of powers between the branches of the federal government 
through both constitutional—under the “case or controversy” requirement 
of Article III2—and prudential sources of judicial restraint.3  As the 
Supreme Court has noted: 
All of the doctrines that cluster about Article III—not only 
standing but mootness, ripeness, political question, and the 
like—relate in part, and in different though overlapping 
ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than 
a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and 
prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Boston College, B.A. 2004; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2009.  I 
would like to thank Professor Richard S. Kay for his invaluable comments and guidance, without 
which this Note would not have been possible.  I would like to dedicate this Note to my parents, who 
have given me unending love and encouragement, and have taught me to think for and believe in 
myself. 
1 Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 
HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1961).   
2 Article III provides, in part, that “[t]he Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under the Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—[and] to Controversies between two or 
more States.”  U.S. CONST. art III, § 2. 
3 The prohibition against jus tertii, or third-party standing, is one such prudential consideration.  
Regarding this doctrine, the Court has stated that “even when the plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient 
to meet the ‘case or controversy’ requirement . . . the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights 
and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”  Warth 
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
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unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.4  
The Supreme Court has stated that the question of standing concerns 
whether “a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable 
controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.”5  More 
specifically, the Court has elucidated three major components to the 
doctrine of constitutional standing.  First, the plaintiff must have suffered 
an “injury-in-fact,” that is, “an invasion of a legally protected interest 
which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) ‘actual or imminent, 
not conjectural or hypothetical.’”6  Second, there must be a causal link 
between the conduct complained of and the injury suffered by the 
plaintiff.7  Third, it must be likely, rather than simply speculative, that the 
injury can be redressed by a judicial decision favoring the plaintiff.8  The 
Court has also asserted that although some of the federal standing model’s 
elements display prudential considerations, the central element of standing 
is tied directly to Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement.9  Thus, 
the Court has developed a doctrine, rooted in the Constitution, which limits 
access to the federal court system to that class of litigants who possess 
“concrete and particularized” injuries causally connected to another party’s 
conduct.10 
The Supreme Court’s constrained articulation of the law of standing 
                                                                                                                          
4 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 
1178–79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring)); see Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive 
Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1882–83 (2001) (noting that 
Article III justiciability doctrine supports this view of separation of powers in two ways: as a matter of 
democratic theory, that is, as a logical means of assigning public questions to the elected branches as 
they are “more politically accountable than unelected federal judges;” and as a matter of institutional 
competence, that is, as a proper means of allocating policymaking to those branches of government that 
possess the resources necessary to adequately assess and monitor the corresponding results).  But see 
Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22 CONN. L. REV. 677, 692 (1990) (noting 
that neither constitutional nor prudential standing requirements are explicitly mentioned in the 
Constitution, but rather that “a requirement is constitutional if the Court says it is, and it is prudential if 
the Court says it is that.  Nothing in the content of the doctrines explains their constitutional or 
prudential status”). 
5 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972). 
6 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted). 
7 Id. at 560; see also Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976) (“[T]he 
‘case or controversy’ limitation of Art. III still requires that a federal court act only to redress injury 
that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results from the 
independent action of some third party not before the court.”). 
8 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 
9 Id. at 560. 
10 Id.  Related to the requirement for a concrete, particularized injury, the Court has asserted that 
standing does not exist “when the asserted harm is a generalized grievance shared in substantially equal 
measure by all or a large class of citizens.”  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Although the Court in Warth noted that this prohibition against “generalized 
grievances” in taxpayer and citizen suits was a prudential bar, almost twenty years later, in Lujan, the 
Court indicated that the limitation was constitutionally based, citing separation of powers concerns.  
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–574 (“We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally 
available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper 
application of the Constitution and laws . . . does not state an Article III case or controversy.”). 
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has led to an accordingly constrained acceptance of non-statutory public 
interest actions where a litigant seeks to vindicate the public interest.11  
These public interest cases often involve a litigant, as taxpayer and/or 
citizen—a so-called “non-Hohfeldian” litigant12—who seeks to challenge 
alleged government illegalities.  The threshold question in these cases, of 
course, is whether the litigant, in his or her capacity as a taxpayer and/or 
citizen, has standing to challenge an alleged unconstitutional or unlawful 
government action.  Because the party asserting the public right is likely to 
be affected no differently than the general public, the federal courts have 
often denied standing to such a party due to concerns such as the 
separation of powers, the need for judicial economy, and the fear of a flood 
of litigation.13  Thus, the current federal standing model creates a number 
of instances where a potential constitutional violation by the government 
may go unchallenged.14 
On the other hand, because state courts are not bound by Article III, 
their role differs from that of the federal courts to varying degrees.15  
Courts in many states allow broad citizen standing on the theory that 
standing “must be viewed in part in light of ‘discretionary doctrines aimed 
at prudently managing judicial review of the legality of public acts.’”16  
Thus, although some states adhere solely to the strict federal system of 
standing, many state courts have developed, through common law, 
alternative standing doctrines that allow citizens or taxpayers to sue on 
                                                                                                                          
11 It is notable that in the federal system, as well as in many states, the legislative branch has 
conferred standing to citizens to sue to enforce particular statutory provisions.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C 
11046(a)(1) (giving citizens the right to sue to enforce the EPCRA, a federal environmental protection 
statute).  This Note, however, focuses exclusively on non-statutory, common law derived citizen 
standing doctrines in the states. 
12 The term “non-Hohfeldian” derives from the scholar Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, who devised a 
categorization of legal rights.  See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).  Ideological plaintiffs, who do 
not fit into any of Hohfeld’s categories of legal rights, are termed “non-Hohfeldian.”  See Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of 
Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984) (“Non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs aspire to secure the enforcement of 
legal principles that touch others as directly as themselves and that are valued for moral or political 
reasons independent of economic interests.”). 
13 See Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or 
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1036 (1968) (“The traditional requirement [for legal 
injury] is one that distinguishes the particular plaintiff from the generality of citizens, taxpayers, and so 
forth, and is required precisely because the argument maintains that the administration of justice is not 
designed to vindicate the interest of the fungible citizen in the enforcement of the law.  The plaintiff, it 
would be said, must seek his relief from the political process where he, along with those who feel as he 
does, will be represented by elected officials.”). 
14 One commentator noted that the Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize federal taxpayer standing 
has effectively “written a large segment of the Constitution out of the reach of judicial protection.”  
Joseph J. Giunta, Standing, Separation of Powers, and the Demise of the Public Citizen, 24 AM. U. L. 
REV. 835, 874 (1975). 
15 For further discussion on the differences between state and federal courts, see infra Part III. 
16 Comm. for an Effective Judiciary v. State, 679 P.2d 1223, 1226 (Mont. 1984) (quoting Stewart 
v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 573 P.2d 184, 186 (Mont. 1977)). 
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behalf of the public interest in cases that involve issues of great 
constitutional importance.17  In these cases, it is often not necessary for a 
litigant to show that his or her interest is protected by positive law, but 
rather it is sufficient that the interest he or she represents is recognized as a 
public value by the court.  The existence of such alternative doctrines 
underscores the significant weight to which many state courts give such 
concerns as the vindication of the public interest and the need for checks 
and balances within a tripartite system of government.   
This Note compares the federal standing model with the vastly 
understudied alternative public interest standing models developed in a 
group of select states.  As such, it provides the first case study that focuses 
on the extent to which states exercise approaches to the standing doctrine 
that diverge from the federal model.18  Additionally, this Note will raise 
questions about the judiciary’s place in democratic governance.  Though it 
does not argue that the federal model ought to be altered or abandoned—
virtually inconceivable given its firm entrenchment in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence—this Note is meant to convey to the reader that liberal 
forms of standing do exist and, in fact, thrive in some United States 
jurisdictions.   
Part II will explore the evolution of the federal standing model in the 
realm of public interest actions, specifically taxpayer cases, through an 
analysis of some of the key Supreme Court decisions from the last eighty-
five years.  Part III will begin with an overview of the broad spectrum of 
state standing doctrines, particularly the states’ public interest standing 
models, and will then delve into a comparative analysis of the key 
differences between the federal judiciary and the states’ judiciaries in the 
constitutional scheme, structurally and theoretically.  These differences—
philosophical, textual, and otherwise—are meant to explain the basis on 
which state courts diverge from federal courts when it comes to the issue 
of standing in the context of public interest litigation. 
As for the specific public interest standing doctrines among the states, 
Parts IV and V will provide a detailed case study of four states which have 
developed such doctrines through their common law.  Part IV will focus on 
states that base their public interest standing doctrines on the character of 
the issue—whether the issue is of great public or constitutional importance, 
and whether there is a significant public need to have the interest 
                                                                                                                          
17 See infra Parts IV, V. 
18 As Professor Jaffe put it, “[m]ost of the writing on standing . . . has been preoccupied with 
federal law.”  Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 
1265, 1268 (1961).  Moreover, “state constitutionalism remains intellectually isolated from a great deal 
of public law scholarship.  Constitutional law courses at U.S. law schools not only ignore state 
constitutions, but also more generally avoid any comparative approach [between federal and state 
systems].”  Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality 
Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1194–95 (1999) (footnotes omitted). 
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vindicated by the judiciary.  Part V will focus on states that base their 
public interest standing doctrines on the character of the litigant—whether 
the litigant is the best party to proceed with a given challenge, and if not, 
whether the constitutional or public issue involved will go unchallenged if 
such litigant is denied standing.  These cases focus on the capacity of the 
litigant to show some connection to the issue and the competence with 
which such a litigant can advocate on behalf of the public.  Thus, the 
analysis within Parts IV and V illuminate the philosophy of the state courts 
which have some form of public interest standing.   
Ultimately, this Note proposes that non-Article III justiciability is 
appropriate in states given the significant differences in constitutional 
background, governance structures, and historical common law 
developments between federal and state judicial systems.  The analysis of 
the public interest standing models will demonstrate the states’ interest in 
ensuring that constitutional limitations on governmental power are 
judicially enforced, as well as their commitment to limiting such review to 
those cases where it is necessary to protect the citizens’ collective rights.19 
II.  STANDING IN PUBLIC ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: A 
RESTRICTIVE FRAMEWORK 
A.  Historical Development of Public Action Litigation: From Frothingham 
to Valley Forge 
The Court’s narrow definition of injury standing in the context of 
taxpayer and citizen standing was first articulated in Frothingham v. 
Mellon.20  Forty-five years later, the Court changed course when, in Flast 
v. Cohen, it granted standing to taxpayers challenging a federal spending 
                                                                                                                          
19 Some commentators have argued that such a public rights approach should be followed in the 
federal courts as well.  See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Collective 
Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 96 (1985) 
(“[T]here is a clear collective societal interest in having the government behave in strict accord with the 
Constitution.  When government violates the Constitution, the stake in the outcome of the controversy 
is society’s stake, and is the most fundamental interest possible: the interest in government functioning 
as agreed upon by [the people] . . . .”); Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1933 (“[J]udicial review of 
government practices—in particular of structural practices that a Hohfeldian rights-holder would not 
otherwise challenge—creates important incentive effects that may deter unconstitutional or otherwise 
arbitrary behavior and thereby secure greater government accountability.”); Jaffe, supra note 13, at 
1045–46 (“Citizen participation is not simply a vehicle for minority protection, but a creative element 
in government and lawmaking. . . . [I]f there is to be judicial protection of the individual from the 
impact of . . . unconstitutional exercises of power . . . an action by a [non-Hohfeldian] plaintiff . . . must 
be allowed.”). 
20 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923).  In Massachusetts v. Mellon, a companion 
case, the Supreme Court denied the State of Massachusetts standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
the Maternity Act.  Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (“The party who invokes the 
power [of judicial review] must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has 
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, 
and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.”). 
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program under the Establishment Clause.21  Despite this marked 
divergence, the Court has retreated to its pre-Flast jurisprudence over the 
past forty years.  From United States v. Richardson22 and Schlesinger v. 
Reservists Committee to Stop the War,23 to Valley Forge Christian College 
v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.24 and most 
recently Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.,25 the Court has 
narrowed the Flast precedent, demonstrating a strict injury-based standing 
model in the public action context.   
In Frothingham, the plaintiff, suing as a federal taxpayer, sought to 
halt expenditures under the Federal Maternity Act of 1921, which gave 
financial grants to states if they cooperated in programs designed to reduce 
maternal and infant mortality.26  The plaintiff claimed that the expenditures 
exceeded Congress’ taxing powers and violated the Tenth Amendment’s 
reservation of powers to the state governments.27  The Supreme Court held 
that it did not have “power per se to review and annul acts of Congress,” 
and that federal judicial review could only be exercised when a plaintiff 
alleged that “some direct injury” was caused by a legislative act and “not 
merely that he suffer[ed] in some indefinite way in common with people 
generally.”28   
Similarly, in Ex parte Levitt, the Court extended this philosophy of 
restraint in the context of a citizen suit over the constitutionality of a 
Supreme Court Justice’s appointment.29  The Court held that the plaintiff 
lacked standing because “it is not sufficient that he has merely a general 
interest common to all members of the public.”30  It was this narrow view 
of the role of the federal courts in adjudicating public action cases that 
informed the Court for the next thirty years. 
The Court departed from its strict injury-based model in Flast, a case 
involving a taxpayer challenge to a federal program providing federal 
funds to assist public and private schools, including religious schools.31  
The Court held that the taxpayers had standing to challenge these 
congressional expenditures as a violation of the First Amendment 
                                                                                                                          
21 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968). 
22 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).   
23 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).   
24 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 
464 (1982).   
25 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).   
26 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 479 (1923). 
27 Id.   
28 Id. at 488. 
29 Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 633 (1937).  In Levitt, the constitutionality of Justice Hugo 
Black’s appointment to the United States Supreme Court was challenged because Black had voted, 
while he was a Senator, to increase Supreme Court Justices’ retirement benefits, in violation of Article 
I, Section 6 of the Constitution.  Id.  
30 Id. at 634. 
31 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85–86 (1968).   
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prohibition against the establishment of religion by the federal 
government.32  The Court distinguished Flast from Frothingham by noting 
that although both cases involved challenges to government spending 
programs, Flast implicated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause—
which is a limit on Congress’ taxing and spending authority—whereas 
Frothingham involved the Tenth Amendment, which does not entail such 
authority.33   
Noting the distinction between standing requirements and separation of 
powers principles, the Flast Court stated that the “question [of] whether a 
particular person is a proper party to maintain the action does not, by its 
own force, raise separation of powers problems . . . . [S]uch problems 
arise, if at all, only from the substantive issues the individual seeks to have 
adjudicated.”34  Rather, the Court noted, the threshold question of standing 
was concerned with “whether the party seeking relief has ‘alleged such a 
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete 
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the 
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional 
questions.’”35  Thus, the Court did not weigh separation of powers 
concerns as heavily as it did in Frothingham, departing from that precedent 
to create its own test to be used in taxpayer standing cases. 
In Flast, the Court articulated a two-part nexus test to determine 
whether a litigant had standing as a federal taxpayer.  First, the taxpayer 
had to establish a logical link between his status as a taxpayer and the type 
of legislation he was challenging.36  The Court qualified this requirement 
by stating that a taxpayer could not challenge the expenditure of funds 
merely “incidental” to a statute, but rather could only do so under the direct 
employment of the taxing and spending clause of Article I, Section 8.37   
                                                                                                                          
32 Id. at 88. 
33 Id. at 105. 
34 Id. at 100–01.  Conversely, three years before ascending to a position as Associate Justice on 
the United States Supreme Court, Justice Scalia penned an influential article that summarized his views 
on the role of the court in the adjudication of public actions and the nature of standing doctrine as a 
means of addressing separation of powers concerns.  Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an 
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881 (1983).  As then-
Judge Scalia puts it, “[n]or is it true, as Flast suggests, that the doctrine of standing cannot possibly 
have any bearing upon the allocation of power among the branches since it only excludes persons and 
not issues from the courts.”  Id. at 892.  He concedes that because some constitutional provisions are 
not amenable to particularized injury, not common to the general public, such provisions would be 
barred from judicial review altogether.  Id.  Contrarily, in states with public interest standing doctrines, 
the courts have often held that for this very reason—that the constitutional or statutory provision may 
go unreviewed or unchallenged if standing is denied to the litigant—standing must be granted to assure 
that such an issue of constitutional significance be addressed, to protect the people’s right to maintain 
the constitutional system of justice they created.  See infra Parts IV, V. 
35 Flast, 392 U.S. at 99 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). 
36 Id. at 102. 
37 Id. (“It will not be sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the 
administration of an essentially regulatory statute.”).  The Taxing and Spending Clause reads: “The 
Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts 
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Second, the Court in Flast stated that the taxpayer had to establish a 
nexus between his status as a taxpayer and the nature of the alleged 
constitutional infringement.38  Therefore, the litigant had to allege that 
Congress’ expenditure exceeded a specific constitutionally-derived 
limitation on the exercise of its taxing and spending power.39  The Court 
held that the plaintiffs satisfied the two-prong nexus test because the 
challenged educational program involved a “substantial expenditure of 
federal tax funds” under Congress’ taxing and spending power, and 
because it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment—a 
specific limitation on that power.40 
Notably, Justice Douglas, in his concurrence in Flast, elucidated for 
the first time his position regarding the proper role of the courts in public 
actions,41 a position he reinforced in his dissents in the Richardson and 
Schlesinger cases.42  Justice Douglas, calling for Frothingham to be 
overturned,43 advocated liberal standing requirements where all federal 
taxpayers be granted standing to challenge federal expenditures.44  Arguing 
a position akin to that of the state courts that allow for public interest 
standing, Justice Douglas recognized that it is not only the judiciary’s 
constitutional role to act as a check to overreaching by the other branches, 
but it is the judiciary’s constitutional duty to do so: 
The judiciary is an indispensable part of the operation of 
our federal system.  With the growing complexities of 
government it is often the one and only place where effective 
relief can be obtained.  If the judiciary were to become a 
super-legislative group sitting in judgment on the affairs of 
people, the situation would be intolerable.  But where wrongs 
to individuals are done by violation of specific guarantees, it 
                                                                                                                          
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts 
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
38 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968) (“Such inquiries into the nexus between the status 
asserted by the litigant and the claim he presents are essential to assure that he is a proper and 
appropriate party to invoke federal judicial power.”). 
39 Id. at 102–03.  The Court did not indicate which, if any, other constitutional provisions limited 
Congress’ taxing and spending power. 
40 Id. at 103. 
41 Id. at 110 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]he role of the federal courts is not only to serve as 
referee between the States and the center but also to protect the individual against prohibited conduct 
by the other two branches of the Federal Government.”). 
42 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 197, 201–02 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); 
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 229–31 (1974) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
43 Flast, 392 U.S. at 111 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“We have a Constitution designed to keep 
government out of private domains.  But the fences have often been broken down; and Frothingham 
denied effective machinery to restore them.”). 
44 Id. at 114. 
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is abdication for courts to close their doors.45 
Although at the time Flast signified a potential shift by the Court 
toward recognizing a more liberalized standard for taxpayer and citizen 
standing,46 the precedent has since been limited to its facts by subsequent 
cases, including the Hein case in 2007.  The first two cases that narrowed 
the Flast precedent and “embraced private rights and separation of powers 
principles in the context of public actions”47 were United States v. 
Richardson48 and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,49 
both decided on the same day in 1974.   
In Richardson, the plaintiff claimed that a congressional enactment 
providing that the Central Intelligence Agency may keep its budget secret 
was unconstitutional because it violated the Accounts Clause.50  The Court 
distinguished Richardson from Flast by noting that the Accounts Clause 
was not a limitation on Congress’ taxing and spending power, and that the 
plaintiff-taxpayer was not challenging a statute enacted under the taxing 
and spending power, but rather one regulating the reporting of 
expenditures by the CIA.51  The Court noted that the litigant, claiming 
injury only as a citizen and federal taxpayer, lacked standing because he 
sought “to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized 
grievances about the conduct of government” rather than alleging violation 
of a particular constitutional right.52 
In Richardson, the plaintiff argued that if he was denied standing, 
nobody could have standing, and that the Accounts Clause would be 
rendered an unenforceable constitutional provision.53  The Court used this 
very claim to reinforce its private rights model—requiring concrete, 
particularized injury to procure standing in a public action—by stating that 
“the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims 
gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the 
surveillance of . . . the political process.”54 
                                                                                                                          
45 Id. at 111. 
46 See Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 601 (1968) 
(“The narrow holding [in Flast] seems impregnable and seems destined to become a long-term 
cornerstone of the law of standing.”).   
47 Eric J. Segall, Standing Between the Court and the Commentators: A Necessity Rationale for 
Public Actions, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 351, 361 (1993). 
48 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171 (1974). 
49 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216–17 (1974).   
50 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 168.  The Accounts Clause provides, in part, that “a regular Statement 
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to 
time.”  U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 7. 
51 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175 (“[T]here is no logical nexus between the asserted status of 
taxpayer and the claimed failure of the Congress to require the Executive to supply a more detailed 
report of the expenditures of that agency.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
52 Id. (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968)) (citations omitted). 
53 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179. 
54 Id.   
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Similarly, in Schlesinger, the Court denied citizen and taxpayer 
standing where the plaintiffs sought to prevent members of Congress from 
serving in the military reserves, which the plaintiffs claimed was a 
violation of the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause.55  As in Richardson, 
stating that a concrete injury rather than a generalized grievance is required 
for justiciability, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing as 
citizens because they sought to “have the Judicial Branch compel the 
Executive Branch to act in conformity with the Incompatibility Clause, an 
interest shared by all citizens.”56  The Court noted that to hold otherwise 
“would create the potential for abuse of the judicial process, distort the role 
of the Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive and the Legislature and 
open the Judiciary to an arguable charge of providing government by 
injunction.”57 
As in his concurrence in Flast58 and in his dissenting opinions in both 
Richardson and Schlesinger, Justice Douglas stated his philosophy 
regarding the proper role of the courts in the constitutional scheme.59  
Justice Douglas proposed a liberalized standing model in cases involving 
issues of constitutional importance that might otherwise go unchecked by 
any of the branches of the federal government.60  Particularly in his 
Schlesinger dissent, Justice Douglas reaffirmed his view that the Court 
must, in its discretion, grant standing to a citizen or taxpayer if the 
constitutional provision would otherwise go unchallenged:  
The interest of the citizen in this constitutional question 
is, of course, common to all citizens.  But . . . “standing is not 
to be denied simply because many people suffer the same 
injury. . . . To deny standing to persons who are in fact 
injured simply because many others are also injured, would 
mean that the most injurious and widespread Government 
actions could be questioned by nobody.”61 
After limiting taxpayer standing to the specific set of facts in Flast, the 
                                                                                                                          
55 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209 (1974).  The 
Incompatibility Clause provides that “no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a 
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”  U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 2. 
56 Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217.   
57 Id. at 222 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
58 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).  
59 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 200–01 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(referring to the views expressed in his Schlesinger dissent); Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 232–34 (Douglas, 
J., dissenting) (describing the role of standing in the judicial process). 
60 See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 234 (“The interest of citizens in guarantees written in the 
Constitution seems obvious. . . . The ‘personal stake’ in the present case is keeping the Incompatibility 
Clause an operative force in the Government by freeing the entanglement of the federal bureaucracy 
with the Legislative Branch.”); Richardson, 418 U.S. at 202 (“[R]esolutions of any doubts or 
ambiguities should be toward protecting an individual’s stake in the integrity of constitutional 
guarantees rather than turning him away without even a chance to be heard.”). 
61 Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 235 (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687–88 (1973)). 
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Court went a step further by narrowing Establishment Clause taxpayer 
standing in Valley Forge.62  In that case, a group of taxpayers and citizens 
challenged the transfer of a federal government-owned hospital to a 
religious organization pursuant to the Federal Property and Administrative 
Services Act, which authorized the executive branch to dispose of surplus 
property.63  The plaintiffs alleged that the transfer of the property violated 
the Establishment Clause on the ground that it constituted government aid 
to religion.64  Noting that the Establishment Clause ought not to be 
regarded differently than any other constitutional provision for the 
purposes of standing,65 the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing 
because they sued merely as taxpayers interested in ensuring that 
government conform to its constitutional duties, failing to identify any 
personal injury “other than the psychological consequence presumably 
produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees.”66  The 
Court distinguished Flast by stating that the plaintiffs in Valley Forge were 
not challenging a congressional statute authorized by the taxing and 
spending power but rather an executive decision—through the Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare—to transfer government property 
authorized by the Property Clause.67   
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, admonished the Court for 
its contrived narrowing of Flast to challenges of Congressional spending 
power, noting the inherent contradiction of the Court’s artificial distinction 
between the two cases.68  Specifically, he noted that in Flast the plaintiffs 
challenged the executive action of the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare, exactly as in Valley Forge.69  Justice Brennan offered a 
scathing rebuke of the majority’s abstruse reading of Flast and federal 
standing doctrine in public actions, accusing the Court of “attempt[ing] to 
distinguish this case from Flast by wrenching snippets of language from 
our opinions . . . [and creating] tortuous distinctions . . . [that] are specious, 
                                                                                                                          
62 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 
464 (1982).   
63 Id. at 469. 
64 Id.  
65 Id. at 484 (“[W]e know of no principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of constitutional 
values or a complementary ‘sliding scale’ of standing which might permit respondents to invoke the 
judicial power of the United States.”). 
66 Id. at 485. 
67 Id. at 479. 
68 Id. at 510 (Brennan, J., dissenting).   
69 Id. at 491 (“[T]he [majority] opinion utterly fails . . . to explain why this case is unlike Flast v. 
Cohen . . . and is controlled instead by Frothingham v. Mellon.”) (citations omitted); see also id. at 512 
(“Whether undertaken pursuant to the Property Clause or the Spending Clause, the breach of the 
Establishment Clause, and the relationship of the taxpayer to that breach, is precisely the same.”).  In 
fact, the named defendant in Flast was Wilbur Cohen, Secretary of the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare.  Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85 (1968). 
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at best: at worst . . . pernicious to our constitutional heritage.”70  Justice 
Brennan suggested that traditional standing doctrine should be modified to 
fit the cases—rather than be mechanically followed—in order that the 
judiciary might redress government wrongdoing that might otherwise go 
unchecked.  This philosophy—mirroring that of Justice Douglas71 as well 
as the state courts which have developed public interest standing 
models72—would not ultimately prevail in the federal courts.  Instead, the 
Court, with few exceptions, continued its trend of limited judicial access to 
plaintiffs in public actions after Valley Forge.   
B.  Hein: Further Narrowing of the Flast Exception to the Preclusion of 
Federal Taxpayer Standing and the Current State of Public Action 
Litigation in the Federal Courts 
After Richardson, Schlesinger, and Valley Forge, taxpayer standing in 
the federal courts appeared permissible only if the plaintiff challenged a 
government expenditure as violating the Establishment Clause.  Moreover, 
the Flast precedent itself seemed to be on shaky ground.73  It was within 
this jurisprudential framework that the Court, last Term, decided Hein v. 
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.74  In Hein, the Court held that 
plaintiff-taxpayers did not have standing under Flast because the 
challenged expenditures were not made pursuant to an Act of Congress, 
but rather were made under general appropriations to the Executive Branch 
to fund day-to-day activities.75 
The executive branch appropriations that the plaintiffs in Hein 
challenged were funding President Bush’s White House Office of Faith-
Based and Community Initiatives and similar offices in various federal 
departments; these offices sponsored conferences throughout the country to 
educate faith-based organizations about the availability of federal 
funding.76  The plaintiffs, as federal taxpayers, claimed that the executive 
branch violated the Establishment Clause by “organizing conferences at 
which faith-based organizations . . . are singled out as being particularly 
worthy of federal funding . . . and the belief in God is extolled as 
                                                                                                                          
70 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 510 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 494 n.5 (“When the 
Constitution makes it clear that a particular person is to be protected from a particular form of 
government action, then that person has a ‘right’ to be free of that action; when that right is infringed, 
then there is injury . . . within the meaning of Art. III.”). 
71 See supra notes 41–45, 59–61 and accompanying text. 
72 See, e.g., infra Parts IV, V. 
73 Note, however, that Flast was reaffirmed in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988) 
(holding that, under Flast, taxpayers had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Adolescent 
Family Life Act, which provided grants conditioned on specific types of counseling to prevent teenage 
pregnancy).  
74 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).   
75 Id. at 2566 (plurality opinion).   
76 Id. at 2560. 
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distinguishing the claimed effectiveness of faith-based social services.”77   
Relying on stare decisis to “leave Flast as we found it,”78 Justice Alito, 
writing for a plurality of three Justices, held that the suit did not fall under 
the narrow exception that Flast had created to the traditional rule against 
taxpayer standing established in Frothingham.79  The Court held that the 
plaintiffs failed to satisfy the first prong of Flast’s nexus test—requiring 
that there be a nexus between taxpayer status and the type of legislative 
action attacked—because the challenged expenditures were neither 
expressly authorized nor mandated by any specific congressional 
enactment.80  Not only did the plurality refuse to extend the Flast holding 
to discretionary executive branch expenditures, it also interpreted 
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Valley Forge as barring taxpayers from 
challenging acts of executive discretion.81 
Fearing a flood of litigation in the federal courts, Justice Alito noted 
that expanding Flast to purely executive expenditures would subject every 
federal action—including conferences and speeches—to a challenge by 
any taxpayer under the Establishment Clause, since “almost all Executive 
Branch activity is ultimately funded by some congressional 
appropriation.”82  Justice Alito noted, as Justice Kennedy did in his 
concurrence,83 that there were significant separation of powers concerns 
inherent in public action litigation.84  Further, he stated that relaxing 
standing requirements would lead to an expansion of judicial power, and 
that “lowering the taxpayer standing bar to permit challenges of purely 
executive actions ‘would significantly alter the allocation of power at the 
national level, with a shift away from a democratic form of 
government.’”85 
Justice Scalia, in a vigorous concurrence joined by Justice Thomas, 
challenged the Court: “Either Flast . . . should be applied to (at a 
minimum) all challenges to the governmental expenditure of general tax 
revenues in a manner alleged to violate a constitutional provision 
specifically limiting the taxing and spending power, or Flast should be 
repudiated.”86  Justice Scalia himself would choose the latter course, 
                                                                                                                          
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 2572.  Justice Alito noted that Hein does not occasion the court to reconsider the Flast 
precedent, since the issue is whether Flast should be extended, not whether it should apply.  Id. at 2571.  
As Justice Alito asserts, “[i]t is a necessary concomitant of the doctrine of stare decisis that a precedent 
is not always expanded to the limit of its logic.  That was the approach that then-Justice Rehnquist took 
. . . in Valley Forge, and it is the approach we take here.”  Id. 
79 Id. at 2571–72. 
80 Id. at 2566. 
81 See id. at 2568–69 (noting that “the Flast exception has largely been confined to its facts”). 
82 Id. at 2569. 
83 Id. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
84 Id. at 2570. 
85 Id. (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
86 Id. at 2573–74 (Scalia, J., concurring).   
 
654 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:639 
effectively overriding Flast.87  Fearing that a liberal taxpayer standing 
model would “[transform] . . . courts into ‘ombudsmen of the general 
welfare,’”88 he urged the Court to overrule Flast, which he believed created 
a precedent that was “wholly irreconcilable” with Article III limitations on 
federal court justiciability.89 
Justice Souter’s dissent, joined by three other Justices, argued that 
there was no rationale “in either logic or precedent” to the illusory 
distinction between legislative and executive causation of injury, where 
standing was granted in the former but not the latter case.90  Indeed, Justice 
Souter asserted that both logic91 and precedent92 militated that Flast be 
followed.  The dissent also questioned why the plurality demonstrated 
greater deference to executive action than to legislative action.93  Justice 
Souter noted that in this unmanageable view of the principle of separation 
of powers, “if the Executive could accomplish through the exercise of 
discretion exactly what Congress cannot do through legislation, 
Establishment Clause protection would melt away.”94 
Thus, Hein was yet another in a long line of Supreme Court cases—
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Valley Forge, among others—that have 
denied public action litigation on standing grounds.  Moreover, the 
conservative makeup of the current Court demonstrates that such a rigid 
formulation of standing in the public action context will be strictly adhered 
to for years to come.  However, the plurality’s rationale in Hein—in 
particular, the line it drew in distinguishing the case from Flast—was 
unpersuasive and arbitrary.  The plurality in Hein was afraid that if the 
                                                                                                                          
87 Id. at 2574.  Justice Scalia criticized the plurality for “laying just claim to be honoring stare 
decisis . . . [while simultaneously] beating Flast to a pulp and then sending it out to the lower courts 
weakened, denigrated, more incomprehensible than ever, and yet somehow technically alive.”  Id. at 
2584. 
88 Id. at 2582 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 487 (1982)). 
89 Id. at 2574.  
90 Id. at 2584 (Souter, J., dissenting).  Justice Brennan, in his Valley Forge dissent, voiced similar 
concern about the Court’s distinction between actions of the legislative branch and those of the 
executive branch:  
[I]t is difficult to conceive of an expenditure for which the last government 
actor, either implementing directly the legislative will, or acting within the scope of 
legislatively delegated authority, is not an Executive Branch official.  The First 
Amendment binds the Government as a whole, regardless of which branch is at 
work in a particular instance. 
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 
511 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
91 See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2585 (2007) (“[T]here is no 
dispute that taxpayer money in identifiable amounts is funding conferences, and these are alleged to 
have the purpose of promoting religion.”). 
92 See id. at 2586 (“[In Bowen,] we recognized the equivalence between a challenge to a 
congressional spending bill and a claim that the Executive Branch was spending an appropriation, each 
in violation of the Establishment Clause.”). 
93 Id. 
94 Id.  
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plaintiffs were allowed to challenge any federal expenditure on 
Establishment grounds, then the federal courts would invariably be flooded 
with claims scrutinizing nearly everything an administration did.95  But this 
fear only exists because of the confusion regarding Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence; the Court has yet to settle on any coherent approach to such 
cases.  Thus, the floodgates fears expressed by the Court are a result of its 
own doing, and can only be ameliorated by clearer, more consistent rules 
regarding standing in public action cases. 
The line drawn by the Court followed only by three Justices 
comprising the plurality shows the Court’s tendency to ground its decisions 
too much in precedent as opposed to constitutional principle and 
coherence.96  Rather than defending the line he has drawn, Justice Alito 
merely argued that the language in Flast appeared to distinguish 
congressional and executive actions, and that subsequent cases—
Richardson, Schlesinger, and Valley Forge—have incorporated such a 
distinction.97  Although the distinction between congressional and 
executive expenditures is illusory,98 it seems this was the only decision the 
Court could have made given the logic it followed—adhering strictly to the 
doctrine of stare decisis.99  However, the premise underlying such a 
distinction is inherently flawed.  Notably, a provision in the Constitution’s 
Appropriations Clause states that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”100  This 
mandates that expenditures from the Treasury must be approved by statute 
to ensure democratic accountability.  Therefore, for an executive program 
to be funded, it must, in essence, be a congressional program as well.  So, 
what logically follows is that if all government expenditures owe their 
legitimacy to congressional authorization, it makes no sense to distinguish 
between expenditures Congress explicitly directed and those which arise 
from executive discretion. 
The impact Hein will have on the Court’s jurisprudence in public 
action litigation is clear.  This precedent leaves open an area of 
government action that likely cannot be challenged in the federal courts.  It 
forecloses an entire class of individuals from suing for violations of the 
                                                                                                                          
95 See id. at 2569 (“Because almost all Executive Branch activity is ultimately funded by some 
congressional appropriation, extending the Flast exception to purely executive expenditures would 
effectively subject every federal action—be it a conference, proclamation or speech—to Establishment 
Clause challenge by any taxpayer in federal court.”).  
96 See supra notes 86–94 and accompanying text. 
97 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2568–69 (2007). 
98 See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text. 
99 See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2569 (noting that such a distinction between executive and legislative 
action had already been made by the Court in Valley Forge).   
100 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
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Establishment Clause.101  Moreover, although the Court did not formally 
overturn Flast, in effect it weakened it to such a degree that it has become 
virtually inapplicable and irrelevant.  The Court allowed for a bypass that 
routes around Flast—that is, general appropriations can be provided to 
executive departments that, in their discretion, may be used to support 
religious programs.  This incentivizes Congress to avoid explicitly 
expressing its policy choices, acting instead covertly through executive 
discretion in order to fall under the auspices of Hein rather than Flast.  
Also, this would allow the executive branch to enact policy choices simply 
by deciding how to spend a blank check offered by Congress.  This 
outcome and the lessening of congressional accountability that would 
result from the increase in disbursing money as general appropriations 
rather than through congressional spending would undermine separation of 
powers and non-delegation principles.  Thus, the Court’s dubious line-
drawing in Hein raises serious concerns about the federal standing model 
and its unevenness in adjudicating public interest actions.   
With these concerns revealed, the rest of this Note will explore the 
spectrum of standing doctrines in the states, with particular emphasis on 
those states which utilize liberal approaches to public interest actions. 
III.  STATE SYSTEMS OF STANDING: A SPECTRUM OF DOCTRINES AND 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
A.  Overview of State Standing Doctrines and Introduction to Public 
Interest Standing in the States 
Unlike federal taxpayers in federal courts, municipal taxpayers and 
state taxpayers in nearly every state have standing to sue in public action 
cases, with variations by jurisdiction in terms of the source and content of 
such taxpayer standing requirements.102  Moreover, many states also have 
common law-derived alternative standing doctrines that allow citizens or 
taxpayers to sue on behalf of the public interest in cases involving issues of 
great constitutional importance.103 
State courts are not bound by Article III,104 and, as such, many state 
standing doctrines diverge from the federal model of standing discussed in 
                                                                                                                          
101 The states discussed in Parts IV and V address the issue of whether such a foreclosure, in fact, 
necessitates judicial review.  See infra Parts IV, V. 
102 See Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1854–55 (noting that taxpayers in almost every state can 
challenge public expenditures without a showing of a particularized injury). 
103 See infra Parts IV, V.  
104 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We have recognized often that the 
constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by 
the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability.”). 
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Part II of this Note.105  These states maintain some form of injury-based 
standing as a threshold test of justiciability,106 but differ from the federal 
system by, for example, issuing advisory opinions,107 granting standing to 
taxpayers challenging the misuse of public funds,108 resolving moot 
disputes,109 and authorizing citizen standing in matters of significant public 
importance, which is the focus of this Note.110 
In granting public interest standing, these jurisdictions focus on, 
among other factors, both the character of the issue and the character of the 
litigant to determine whether or not to grant standing to a non-Hohfeldian 
litigant.  The character of the issue factor queries whether the issue is of 
great public or constitutional importance and whether there is a pressing 
need to get the particular public interest vindicated by the judiciary.  The 
character of the litigant factor deals with the capacity of the putative 
plaintiff to be the best advocate for the public interest involved, both in the 
sense that he or she shows a connection with the question presented, and he 
or she possesses the competence and seriousness necessary to be a good 
advocate.  It also considers whether the provision in question would go 
unchallenged if such plaintiff were denied standing. 
Public interest standing doctrines vary by state as a result of 
differences in historical developments, economic and social considerations, 
states’ governing structures, and states’ jurisprudential concerns.  Despite 
the differences, these state courts share a commitment, within a 
discretionary framework, to vindicating shared constitutional interests 
where legislative activity or executive action or inaction have led to 
injuries that are not specific to individual litigants, but rather where “the 
legal right [the litigants] seek to enforce is not the correlative of a legal 
                                                                                                                          
105 See supra Part II.  Despite the divergent trend in many states, a number of jurisdictions adhere 
to a strict injury-based standing analysis that derives in part from the Article III federal model.  See, 
e.g., Ferguson Mech. Co., Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 282 Conn. 764 (2007); Goto v. D.C. Bd. of 
Zoning Adjustment, 423 A.2d 917 (D.C. 1980); Henderson v. Miller, 592 N.E.2d 570 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1992); Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestlé Waters N. Am., Inc., 479 Mich. 280 (2007); 
City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 (Tenn. 2001); Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364 
(2001).  
106 See, e.g., Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 148 P.3d 960, 972 (Utah 2006). 
107 See Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1844–52 (discussing state courts that issue advisory opinions). 
108 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
109 See Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1859–61 (discussing state courts that resolve moot disputes). 
110 See, e.g., Trustees for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1987); Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 
1013 (Ariz. 1998); Ho‘opulapula v. Bd. of Land and Natural Res., 143 P.3d 1230 (Haw. 2006); State ex 
rel. Cittadine v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978 (Ind. 2003); Tax Equity Alliance for Mass. v. 
Comm’r of Revenue, 672 N.E.2d 504 (Mass. 1996); Stewart v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Big Horn 
County, 573 P.2d 184 (Mont. 1977); Cunningham v. Exon, 276 N.W.2d 213 (Neb. 1979); State ex rel. 
Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11 (N.M. 1995); State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 
N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999); State ex rel. Howard v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 614 P.2d 45 (Okla. 1980); 
Sprague v. Casey, 550 A.2d 184 (Pa. 1988); Stumes v. Bloomberg, 551 N.W.2d 590 (S.D. 1996); 
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983); Wash. Natural Gas Co. v. Pub. Utility Dist. No. 1 of 
Snohomish County, 459 P.2d 633 (Wash. 1969).   
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duty owed to them.”111 
State courts with public interest standing doctrines have been 
successful in balancing the need to address important constitutional issues 
with the need to limit the judiciary’s interference with other branches of 
government.112  The proliferation of alternative judicial practices in these 
states raises questions about conventional assumptions regarding judicial 
capacity and restraint, the role of courts in the interpretation and 
enforcement of constitutional norms, and the idea of inherent limitations to 
adjudication.113  What is it about the state judiciary, or more generally the 
governing structure of the states, that make state courts more hospitable to 
a public interest standing model than the federal courts?  An analysis of 
prudential and policy considerations is necessary to adequately address this 
inquiry. 
B.  Policy Considerations: Differences between Federal and State Courts 
1.  Textual Differences between Federal and State Constitutions 
The constitutional source of federal justiciability doctrine rests in 
Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement, which the Court has 
interpreted as restricting the business of federal courts to “questions 
presented . . . in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through 
the judicial process.”114  However, state courts have noted that the “case or 
controversy” requirement in Article III does not exist in many state 
constitutions, and that such states are not bound by the same justiciability 
                                                                                                                          
111 Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1854.  Conversely, in the federal courts, constitutional and 
prudential limitations, reflecting separation of powers concerns, have led to a policy of denying 
standing in cases where the vindication of public rights is sought without evidence of direct injury to 
the litigant.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (“[I]gnoring the concrete 
injury requirement . . . would be discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct 
constitutional role of the Third Branch . . . . Vindicating the public interest (including the public interest 
in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief 
Executive.”). 
112 Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1854.  “Because state constitutions include many substantive social 
and economic provisions, taxpayer [and citizen] standing provides an important mechanism for 
regulatory enforcement and policy elaboration . . . . It also affords state courts opportunities to reshape 
government structures in light of evolving needs.”  Id. at 1855 (footnote omitted). 
113 The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged the legitimacy of granting standing in cases of 
great public importance, where direct injury may be untenable: “There would be nothing irrational 
about a system that granted standing in these cases; some European constitutional courts operate under 
one or another variant of such a regime.”  Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828 (1997).  See generally 
INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW, STANDING TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Richard S. Kay ed., 2005) (detailing the standing doctrines of twelve 
countries in the context of challenges regarding the constitutionality of government acts, including 
countries with doctrines similar to the public interest standing doctrines in the states, such as Canada, 
which has a discretionary doctrine that grants standing to litigants in cases where such litigants possess 
no particularized, concrete injury distinct from the general public). 
114 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). 
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limitations as their federal counterparts.115  Accordingly, the absence of 
Article III language, or its functional equivalent, is taken to correlate with 
an increase in the scope of judicial review related to legislative and 
executive actions in states with liberal standing doctrines.116 
Many state courts diverge even further from Article III jurisprudence 
as a result of additional textual differences.  For example, some state 
constitutions possess “open court” provisions that guarantee public access 
to the courts and restrict the state legislature’s power to regulate judicial 
authority.117  Moreover, unlike the federal Constitution, every state 
constitution has gone through substantial amendment over the years, and 
thus explicitly provides for more public rights and interests that state courts 
must accordingly interpret and enforce.118  Consequently, many 
commentators agree that “these new forms of property have ‘generated 
pressure to increase judicial control of administrative conduct beyond what 
could be fairly assimilated within the Hohfeldian framework’ that current 
federal justiciability doctrine accepts.”119 
2.  Electoral Accountability of State Judges 
As explained in Part II of this Note, the separation of powers doctrine 
has historically played an essential and often dispositive role in the federal 
system of standing.120  The significance of the separation of powers policy 
in federal justiciability doctrine is based, in part, on the institutional 
structure of the federal government, namely that of a single President aided 
by administrative agencies, a bicameral Congress elected by majoritarian 
process, and Article III courts that are unelected, independent, and 
(theoretically) apolitical.121   
State government institutions differ markedly from the federal 
structure, and thus the separation of powers doctrine plays a different, far 
less pivotal role in state courts’ systems of standing.122  For example, state 
                                                                                                                          
115 See, e.g., Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts, Inc., 108 P.3d 917, 919 (Ariz. 2005) (“We have 
previously concluded that ‘the question of standing in Arizona is not a constitutional mandate since we 
have no counterpart to the case or controversy requirement of the federal constitution’ . . . and thus, 
when addressing questions of standing ‘we are confronted only with questions of prudential or judicial 
restraint.’”) (quoting Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v. Episcopal Cmty. Servs. in Arizona, 712 
P.2d 914, 919 (Ariz. 1985)); Keller v. Flaherty, 600 N.E.2d 736, 738 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (“Ohio has 
no constitutional counterpart to Section 2, Article III.”).  
116 See infra Parts IV, V. 
117 Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1880. 
118 Id. at 1881. 
119 Id. at 1882 (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 279–
80 n.14 (1984)). 
120 See supra Part II (discussing the key Supreme Court decisions from the last eighty-five years 
that shaped the federal standing model in the realm of public interest actions). 
121 Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1883. 
122 Id. at 1886 (“Although separation of powers shows marked variation in the fifty states, one can 
draw general distinctions between the state systems and the federal system that implicate justiciability 
and challenge many of the assumptions underlying federal doctrine as applied to state courts.”).  
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court judges are perceived as more actively engaged in the political process 
than their Article III federal counterparts because they are popularly 
elected in all but a few jurisdictions,123 have often had prior legislative 
experience as state legislators, and participate to a greater degree in 
shaping the law.124  Hence, the court system carries a “democratic 
portfolio.”125  Generally speaking, state court judges—many of whom are 
without the protection of a life tenure—are more politically dependent than 
federal court judges.126  Further reflecting the political accountability of 
state judges is the fact that state judicial districts tend to be smaller than 
their federal equivalents.127  Accordingly, state judges are likely to be more 
closely tied to their local communities and respond more actively to local 
issues.128  Because state judges are closer to and more familiar with local 
problems, and are the products of local political processes, they may be 
better equipped than federal judges to work effectively with other branches 
of government in developing new constitutional resolutions and to deal 
with the fiscal ramifications of such decisions.129   
An elected judiciary, among other factors, also provides for state 
                                                                                                                          
Professor Hershkoff notes that the balance of power among the branches of government within the 
states’ governing systems tends to be more diffuse than that of the federal governing system, which 
emphasizes the importance of clear delineations among the branches: in states, “[p]ower is instead 
diffused horizontally across the branches, as well as vertically between the states and myriad local 
units, reflecting . . . a ‘principle of shared, rather than completely separated powers . . . a system of 
separateness with interdependence, autonomy with reciprocity.’”  Id. at 1905 (quoting Shirley S. 
Abrahamson, Remarks of the Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson Before the American Bar Association 
Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence, Washington D.C., (Dec. 13, 1996), 
12 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 69, 71 (1996)). 
123 Hershkoff, supra note 18, at 1158; see id. (“The fact of judicial election . . . alter[s] the 
political vulnerability of state judges, subjecting them to a kind of popular veto that in theory sets a 
boundary or tether on judicial decisionmaking.”).  
124 See Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by Correcting the 
Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397, 414 (1999) (“Thirty-nine of the 
fifty states presently provide a measure of political accountability for judges through some form of 
election.”); Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1939 (“The local and populist decisionmaking devices that 
characterize nonfederal lawmaking increase the opportunities for factions to seize control of political 
power, necessitating oversight that might include judicial review.”); Hans A. Linde, The State and 
Federal Courts in Governance: Vive La Difference!, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273, 1286 (2005) 
(“[S]tate courts are closer to politics than their federal colleagues, whether the state judges are elected 
or appointed.”).   
125 Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1887.   
126 Id.; see also John C. Reitz, Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues as a Reflection of Political 
Economy, in STANDING TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 257, 285 
(Richard S. Kay ed., 2005) (“Most state court judges are elected for terms, rather than appointed for life 
like the federal judges, making them arguably more democratically responsive and more suitable to 
wield the expanded lawmaking power, which liberal standing rules confer.”). 
127 Hershkoff, supra note 18, at 1887.  
128 Id. at 1168. 
129 Id.; see Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the 
Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 976 (1985) (“[S]tate judges are 
systematically exposed to and experienced in the legal institutions of their states . . . . [and] are much 
more likely than are their federal counterparts to know or be able to learn readily what is out there, how 
it came to be, and how well or badly it works.”). 
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courts’ “inherent” or “plenary” authority.130  While federal district courts—
which only possess jurisdiction authorized by Congress pursuant to Article 
III, Section 1 of the federal Constitution131—have limited and constrained 
authority, state judicial power is more expansive in scope and breadth.  The 
idea of a state judiciary’s inherent authority lends credibility and 
democratic legitimacy to a state court’s independent and activist role in 
shaping public policy and engaging in public interest decision-making.132  
Thus, even where a state constitution or statutory scheme does not provide 
for an explicit grant of jurisdiction, a state court’s plenary power gives it a 
persuasive rationale for expanding its jurisdictional scope to cases 
involving non-Hohfeldian litigants. 
3.  Prevalence of Positive Rights in State Constitutions 
There is a greater specificity in state constitutional provisions relative 
to federal provisions; that is, state constitutions provide for positive rights 
that mandate action on the part of the state government, whereas the 
federal Constitution only provides negative rights by restraining 
government action as a means of addressing issues of federalism and 
separation of powers.133  State constitutions address a wider range of social 
and economic issues than the federal Constitution, including public 
schooling, welfare, and environmental regulation.134  These state 
provisions encourage and often depend upon judicial involvement for their 
interpretation and enforcement.  In fact, many state courts display a 
willingness to grant standing in cases where a litigant does not suffer a 
direct injury but where judicial review is otherwise necessary because the 
case involves “a controversy [that] is of substantial public importance, 
immediately affect[ing] significant segments of the population, and [that] 
has a direct bearing on commerce, finance, labor, industry, or 
agriculture.”135   
While federal justiciability doctrine reflects deference to Congress and 
the Executive regarding policymaking and enforcement, state courts are 
                                                                                                                          
130 Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1888. 
131 “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”  U.S. CONST. art III, § 1 
(emphasis added). 
132 See Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1888 (“[S]tate courts emphasize the importance of such 
[plenary] authority to maintaining their independence relative to the other branches and to the 
people.”). 
133 See id. at 1889–90 (“[B]ecause state constitutions often include positive rights and regulatory 
norms, their texts explicitly engage state courts in substantive areas that have historically been outside 
the Article III domain.”).   
134 Id. at 1839. 
135 Grant County Fire Prot. Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 83 P.3d 419, 424 (Wash. 2004); see 
Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 248 (1972) (“State courts 
settle contests over public offices, pass on the propriety of proposed public expenditures and even of 
proposed constitutional amendments, often at the suit of mere ‘taxpayers.’”). 
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often more engaged in these aspects of governance.136  This is due in large 
part to the fact that state constitutions reflect less faith in state legislatures 
than the federal Constitution does in Congress; state constitutions tend to 
impose substantive and procedural requirements on legislative activity, 
often seen in the area of state fiscal authority.137  Also, through popular 
mechanisms such as referendums and initiatives, state constitutions are 
more easily amendable than the federal Constitution.138  Through such 
amendments, state constitutions have expanded the list of rights and 
interests that state courts may interpret.139  Accordingly, a state 
legislature’s failure to adhere to such explicit constitutional demands 
invokes the judiciary’s role as an elaborator of the constitutional mandate 
and vindicator of the public interest.140  Therefore, state courts play a 
pivotal role in the vindication of public rights and the public interest by 
being more actively engaged in protecting the people from government’s 
constitutional violations.   
4.  Lack of Federalism Concerns in State Courts 
Federalism deals with the proper boundary between national and state 
or local governmental affairs.  The federalist structure of government—that 
is, the distinctive vertical power division between the federal and state 
governing institutions—is implicated in various provisions of the federal 
Constitution.141  The Supreme Court has traditionally adhered to the 
recognition of federalist constraints and the principle of comity that favors 
state sovereignty over federal judicial authority.142  Article III judicial 
restraint in the area of state sovereignty serves federalism values by 
                                                                                                                          
136 Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1891–92.   
137 See id. at 1894 (“[S]uch provisions alter the dynamics of lawmaking, implicating the state 
courts in the resolution of certain governance questions that are largely outside the Article III 
experience.”). 
138 See Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1888 (citing John Kincaid, State Constitutions in the Federal 
System, 496 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 12, 13 (1988)). 
139 Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1881.  Conversely, the federal Constitution “leaves the vast 
majority of social decisions to elected officials.  It does not specify whether taxes should be high or 
low.  It neither requires nor forbids governments to offer welfare benefits . . . [and] [i]t does not specify 
what government departments should exist and how they should be structured; that is for Congress to 
decide.”  Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 125 (2007) (citations 
omitted). 
140 See Hershkoff, supra note 18, at 1156 (“Unlike federal courts, state courts are frequently 
counted on to resolve constitutional questions that implicate the courts directly in day-to-day political 
issues and that encourage them to act as interdependent members of state government.”) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
141 For example, Article I states that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in . . . 
Congress.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.  The implication is that Congress can act only if there is clearly 
vested authority, with all other governance left to the states.  Further clarifying this and other federalist 
implications within the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
142 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713–15 (1999) (noting that the federal system created 
by the Constitution preserves the sovereign status of the states). 
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promoting self-governance and accountability.143   
While federalism exists on the federal level to temper the scope of 
federal courts’ judicial review, it does not have such an effect on state 
courts.144  The decision of a particular state court, which binds only the 
people of that state, is viewed as having more democratic legitimacy and 
local relevance than the decision of its Article III federal counterpart.145  
Moreover, a state court’s ruling often fosters public dialogue between the 
branches of state government and the people, whereas the “finality of 
federal constitutional adjudication” often tends to halt public discourse in 
its tracks.146 
State constitutions are readily subject to revision through a number of 
procedural mechanisms absent from Article V in the U.S. Constitution,147 
such as the citizen initiative, which allows a minority of a state’s electorate 
to put a proposed constitutional change on the ballot for consideration by 
the entire electorate.148  Consequently, state court judges exercise, in the 
words of one commentator, “a greater willingness to experiment with legal 
norms, on the assumption that their judgments comprise only the opening 
statement in a public dialogue with the other branches of government and 
the people.”149  Such a judicial approach explains the prevalence in state 
courts of public interest litigation challenging the constitutionality of 
government actions. 
As this analysis has demonstrated, the prevalence of public interest 
standing in state courts is a result of the extent to which the states’ 
governing institutions and the balance of such institutions often differ 
markedly from that of the federal structure.  It is with this as a background 
that the next parts of this Note—Parts IV and V—explore the 
characteristics of select states’ public interest standing doctrines through an 
in-depth case study.150          
                                                                                                                          
143 Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1900–01. 
144 See Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV. 271, 
278 (1998) (“Whereas states occupy an essential role in the American constitutional system, there is no 
equivalent principle of federalism . . . in state constitutionalism.”); see also Hershkoff, supra note 18, at 
1168 (“State courts themselves cite an absence of federalism concerns, to justify both their enforcement 
of positive rights . . . and their use of non-Article III interpretive techniques.”). 
145 Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1902. 
146 See id. (“State courts can thus serve an agenda-setting function that produces greater 
democratic discourse and encourages the participatory values associated with federalism.”); see also 
Hershkoff, supra note 18, at 1169 (“[S]tate courts, working collaboratively with the elected branches, 
afford citizens greater opportunities to participate in the process of governance.”). 
147 See U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring either two-thirds of both Houses of Congress or an 
application from two-thirds of the states to propose a constitutional amendment, and further requiring 
three-fourths of the states by legislative vote or by convention for such constitutional amendment to be 
ratified). 
148 Hershkoff, supra note 18, at 1163 (discussing the citizen initiative). 
149 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
150 See infra Parts IV, V.  The case study approach by which these Parts are framed is unique to 
the area of state justiciability research.  As Professor Hershkoff stated, “[f]uture empirical research 
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IV.  PUBLIC INTEREST STANDING IN SELECT STATES: CHARACTER OF THE 
ISSUE AS BASIS FOR JUSTICIABILITY 
As Part II showed, the Supreme Court’s constrained approach to public 
actions sweeps so broadly that it renders some constitutional provisions 
judicially unreviewable and thus futile as limitations on government 
power.  Conversely, the state courts surveyed in Parts IV and V display a 
common jurisprudential thread grounded in the rationale that the courts 
must hear those public interest cases meeting the criteria of their respective 
public interest standing doctrines in order to ensure that portions of the 
state constitutions are not left unenforceable.  The doctrines demonstrate 
the idea that judicial review is a necessary component of the states’ 
systems of limited government powers; there would be no effective check 
on the elected branches without such review.151  Though this public rights 
approach is unlikely—and perhaps even unfit—to be applied in the federal 
courts, it seems an appropriate approach in the states in cases where the 
constitutional provision at issue protects societal rights, rather than merely 
individual rights.152  Through the use of public interest standing models, 
this approach limits judicial review in public actions to circumstances 
where it is necessary to protect collective, societal rights while 
simultaneously ensuring that constitutional limitations on governmental 
power are judicially enforced.153 
The states that possess public interest standing doctrines focus on 
various factors by which to grant or deny public interest standing under 
their respective models.  These factors form a mosaic by which the courts 
use their discretion to balance the competing interests involved in the 
context of public interest cases.  While the courts often weigh the multiple 
factors equally, the states selected for the purposes of this Note can be used 
to illustrate two key factors—the character of the issue and the character of 
the litigant.   
New Mexico and Ohio are two states that aptly illustrate the first 
                                                                                                                          
could usefully focus on the extent to which states currently exercise nonfederal approaches to 
justiciability doctrine, and the relation between existing state institutional structures and the scope of 
the judicial function.”  Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1842. 
151 See Jaffe, supra note 18, at 1284 (“Intervention in [public actions] may rest not so much on the 
‘judiciality’ of the issue as on the lack of an alternative forum: When the claimant is not likely to obtain 
justice elsewhere, the judiciary is justified in running the risks of straining its competence.”). 
152 The fact that public interest standing models work in the states, whereas there is no equivalent 
in the federal system, is likely the result of the differences between state and federal courts discussed in 
Part III, supra.  See also Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City 
of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1391 (1978) (“[I]ts defense must 
lie in characteristics of the state courts, ostensibly not shared by the federal courts—familiarity with 
local conditions and state law, the ability to fashion rules and relief confined in scope to their own 
states, [and] closeness to the state's legislative and political processes.”). 
153 See Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1919 (“Granting standing or hearing some other form of public 
action also has expressive value, conferring status and legitimacy on self-defined groups of litigants, 
with consequent positive effects on public discourse and public policy.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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factor—the character of the issue as a basis for the determination of 
whether to grant or deny standing to non-Hohfeldian litigants in public 
interest cases.  This factor deals with (1) whether the issue involved in the 
litigation is of great public or constitutional importance, and (2) whether 
there is a great public need to have the interest or rule vindicated by the 
judiciary, as opposed to leaving the issue to be addressed through the 
political process.154  Thus, a balancing of competing interests and a 
weighing of costs and benefits to both the public and to the judiciary—its 
independence and autonomy—are considered by these state courts on a 
case-by-case basis in the implementation of their discretionary standing 
doctrines.   
A.  New Mexico: Public Importance Doctrine 
As a well-established exception to its traditional doctrine of injury 
standing, New Mexico’s “public importance doctrine” provides a 
discretionary grant of standing for private parties who otherwise lack 
standing under the traditional framework.155  The doctrine offers private 
litigants—as taxpayers, citizens, or voters—an opportunity to present to 
the judiciary a grievance that may be generalized in nature.  However, for 
the issue to be of sufficient “public importance,” it must involve a 
government action that allegedly interferes with “the essential nature of 
state government guaranteed to New Mexico citizens under their 
Constitution—a government in which the ‘three distinct departments, . . . 
legislative, executive, and judicial,’ remain within the bounds of their 
constitutional powers.”156  Thus, New Mexico’s judiciary has developed a 
doctrine that, while limited by separation of powers concerns, provides it 
with a more active role than its federal counterpart in the adjudication of 
cases involving the public interest.   
In State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, the New Mexico Supreme Court 
granted standing to plaintiffs on the basis of the fundamental importance of 
the constitutional issues involved.157  The court held that it had jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                          
154 In one of his well-known articles, legal scholar Louis L. Jaffe proposed a similar scheme of 
judicial discretion in public actions based on the character of the issue: 
We might look for our discriminant to the character of the claim asserted.  
Since the moving party is a citizen, the suit may be most appropriate when he 
purports to assert interests which are of peculiar citizen concern.  “Citizen concern” 
might be conceived of in terms of demands for the enforcement (1) of norms 
generally accepted as appropriate for the proper day-to-day conduct of government, 
or (2) of norms basic to the political and social process and to the citizen’s 
participation in it, particularly where the political process itself does not reliably 
enforce the claim. 
Jaffe, supra note 18, at 1296. 
155 State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11, 17–18 (N.M. 1995).  
156 State ex rel. Coll v. Johnson, 990 P.2d 1277, 1284 (N.M. 1999) (quoting N.M. CONST. art. III, 
§ 1).   
157 Clark, 904 P.2d at 18. 
 
666 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:639 
to issue a writ of mandamus and a declaratory judgment in a case where 
the plaintiffs—in their capacity as voters and taxpayers of the state—
sought, under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), to preclude the 
governor from implementing gaming compacts and revenue sharing 
agreements entered into with Indian tribes and pueblos.158  The plaintiffs 
alleged that the governor lacked the constitutional authority to commit the 
state to the compacts and agreements because he was attempting to 
exercise legislative authority contrary to the state constitution’s separation 
of powers doctrine.159  The court concluded that the public importance 
doctrine applied since the plaintiffs asserted that the governor had 
exercised the state legislature’s authority, in direct violation of the 
constitutionally-based separation of powers requirement.160  Highlighting 
one of the underlying discretionary justifications for the public importance 
doctrine, the court noted that in resolving the constitutional issues 
involved, it would “contribute to this State’s definition of itself as 
sovereign.”161  Clark serves as an example of a state court’s active role in 
policing the boundaries within a constitutional system of government. 
Similarly, in State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, the court granted standing 
under the public importance doctrine to private litigants in an action for 
mandamus, challenging the power of the executive branch, specifically the 
Governor and Secretary of New Mexico Human Services Department, to 
effect an overhaul of the state’s public assistance system without 
legislative participation.162  The case involved an issue of constitutional 
magnitude: whether the executive branch had exceeded its constitutional 
authority in enacting and implementing welfare regulations, in violation of 
the state constitution’s separation of powers doctrine.163  Thus, the court 
noted that the case—rather than involving the merits of public assistance 
reform—concerned the “sanctity of the New Mexico Constitution and the 
judiciary’s obligation to uphold the principles therein.”164  Drawing a 
comparison with Clark, the court applied the public importance doctrine in 
granting standing to the plaintiffs, noting that where the government 
actors’ actions implicate separation of powers considerations, and where 
“[t]he balance and maintenance of governmental power is of great public 
concern,” the application of such doctrine is appropriate where traditional 
standing might not exist.165  This decision, as with the decision in Clark, 
highlights the New Mexico judiciary’s active role in adjudicating issues of 
                                                                                                                          
158 Id. at 17–19. 
159 Id. at 15. 
160 Id. at 18. 
161 Id. 
162 State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 961 P.2d 768, 771 (N.M. 1998). 
163 Id.  
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 773.  
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constitutional import, especially where the resolution of such issues affect 
a majority of citizens and where the government action at issue implicates 
the separation of powers doctrine.   
However, due to the activist approach that the court takes in Clark and 
Taylor, these decisions could be construed as resembling advisory 
opinions, an illegitimate form of judicial review in New Mexico.166  Thus, 
while the public importance doctrine is theoretically sound and objective, 
in practice it leaves a great deal—perhaps too much—discretion in the 
hands of judges, where somewhat subjective line-drawing inevitably 
occurs in distinguishing between those public actions worthy of 
adjudication and those that are not.  Another concern is that in deciding 
whether the doctrine applies, judges must be sure to separate the issue of 
standing from the merits of the case, a difficult task for any adjudicator.  
Despite these concerns, the benefits of the doctrine—increasing judicial 
access to those who present issues of public import, interpreting the 
constitution and ensuring that such constitution is adhered to by 
government actors—outweigh the potential for abuse and overreaching by 
the judiciary.  Moreover, despite the New Mexico judiciary’s openness 
toward non-Hohfeldian litigants, it has expressed a cautious approach to 
the invocation of the public importance doctrine.  The New Mexico 
Supreme Court, for instance, has conveyed that if a litigant’s generalized 
allegation of governmental wrongdoing did not involve a clear legal duty 
on the part of the government to execute the actions he or she sought to be 
performed, public interest standing would not be granted.167  Thus, despite 
some concerns as to its application, the case law indicates that New 
Mexico has maintained a doctrine of public interest standing which 
successfully limits judicial review in public actions to circumstances where 
it is necessary to protect the collective rights of its citizens.  
B.  Ohio: Public Right Doctrine 
In its “public right doctrine,” Ohio recognizes an expansive, liberal 
standing definition as an alternative to its traditional injury standing 
model.168  The doctrine applies where the object of a mandamus and/or 
prohibition action is to procure the enforcement or protection of a public 
right (as opposed to a purely private right), such as where a plaintiff asserts 
that a coequal branch of government has exceeded its constitutional 
                                                                                                                          
166 U S W. Commc’n, Inc. v. N.M. State Corp. Comm’n, 965 P.2d 917, 920 (N.M. 1998). 
167 See, e.g., State ex rel. Coll v. Johnson, 990 P.2d 1277, 1284 (N.M. 1999) (holding that 
plaintiffs—state legislators, private citizens and a non-profit corporation—did not have standing under 
the public importance doctrine to challenge the legality of legislation authorizing Indian gaming in the 
state). 
168 State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1082–83 (Ohio 1999). 
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authority.169  In such a public action, it is sufficient that the litigant is an 
Ohio citizen and by extension interested in the proper execution of state 
laws.170  Ohio courts have applied the public action doctrine with restraint, 
however, invoking it only in those “exceptional circumstances that demand 
early resolution.”171 
In State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, the Ohio 
Supreme Court granted standing under the public right doctrine to 
organizations and private citizens in a mandamus action challenging the 
constitutionality of a legislative enactment amending statutes and rules 
relating to tort and other civil actions.172  The court noted that in the federal 
system of standing, the necessity of showing actual injury exists regardless 
of whether the plaintiff seeks to enforce a private or public right.173  The 
court added, however, that because Ohio state courts are not bound by 
limitations upon standing imposed by the U.S. Constitution, they are “free 
to dispense with the requirement for injury where the public interest so 
demands.”174   
When issues sought to be litigated are of great public importance or 
interest, it has been the court’s long-standing practice to entertain a public 
action where no rights or obligations peculiar to named plaintiffs are 
involved.175  In granting plaintiffs standing, the court in Sheward 
concluded that the instant case was a “public action” in that the plaintiffs 
had alleged that the legislature had attempted to usurp the judiciary’s 
power through its attempt at reforming the state’s tort system.176  Thus, the 
citizenry’s interest in keeping the state’s judicial power in the hands of the 
judiciary, where it had been constitutionally vested by the people, was 
invoked.177  Moreover, the case dealt with an issue of “great public 
importance,” in that it involved a challenge to the constitutionality of 
legislative enactments on the grounds that such enactments directly and 
                                                                                                                          
169 Id. at 1083. 
170 Id. at 1083; see also State ex rel. Meyer v. Henderson, 38 Ohio St. 644, 649 (1883) (“[W]here 
the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a 
public duty, the people are regarded as the real party, and the relator need not show that he has any 
legal or special interest in the result.”). 
171 Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1111 (Pfeifer, J., concurring); see also Jaffe, supra note 18, at 1314 
(“[T]he public action is conceived as an action to vindicate the general public interest.  Not all alleged 
illegalities or irregularities are thought to be of that high order of concern.”).   
172 Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1084–85. 
173 Id. at 1081. 
174 Id. 
175 See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1083 (Ohio 
1999). (“[T]he public action is fully conceived in Ohio as a means to vindicate the general public 
interest.”) (emphasis added); State ex rel. Newell v. Brown, 122 N.E.2d 105, 107 (Ohio 1954) (“Where 
a public right . . . is involved, a citizen need not show any special interest therein, but he may maintain 
a proper action predicated on his citizenship relation to such public right.  This doctrine has been 
steadily adhered to by this court over the years.”) (emphasis added). 
176 Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1084.  
177 Id. 
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broadly operated to deny the courts of judicial power.178   
Sheward demonstrates the active role of the Ohio court system in the 
adjudication of public interest cases, especially when separation of powers 
concerns are raised.  However, Sheward might also be interpreted as a 
power struggle between the judiciary and the legislature over the issue of 
tort reform.  The court may have acted more out of a fear of losing its 
power than out of a desire to vindicate the public interest.  Again, as with 
New Mexico’s public importance doctrine, Ohio’s public right doctrine 
vests a great deal of discretion with the judiciary, for better or for worse.  
Additionally, it might be argued that the doctrine fails to adequately 
separate the issue of standing from the merits of the case—of course, such 
a distinction might be impractical in determining standing in public action 
cases.  
The public right doctrine was also applied in State ex rel. Newell v. 
Brown, a case involving a litigant—as citizen, taxpayer, and elector—who 
filed an action in prohibition seeking to prevent the Ohio Secretary of State 
and the members of the county board of elections from placing the names 
of certain candidates for the office of various judgeships on ballots.179  The 
court asserted that “as a matter of public policy, a citizen of a community 
does have such an interest in his government as to give him the capacity to 
maintain a proper action to enforce the performance of a public duty 
affecting himself as a citizen and citizens generally.”180  Because the 
plaintiff was a citizen of the state, because the issue—the constitutionality 
of the actions of public officials—was a public right of great public import, 
and because the relief sought was the enforcement of a public duty by such 
public officers, the court granted standing to the plaintiff to hear the merits 
of the case.  Although it is possible that a litigant more directly affected by 
the government action, such as an opposing candidate, might have been a 
more appropriate litigant, there is no indication in the opinion that such a 
litigant had brought or was likely to have brought the claim.  Furthermore, 
because the election was to occur within a month of this decision, it 
appears that the court was not, in light of “public policy,” willing to wait 
for another litigant to bring the claim.  Thus, this seems a prudent decision, 
fitting the public right doctrine’s designation of an “exceptional 
circumstance[] that demand[s] early resolution.”181 
                                                                                                                          
178 Id. at 1104. 
179 Newell, 122 N.E.2d at 106.  Similarly, in the context of a taxpayer action, the court held that 
the plaintiff-taxpayer had standing to enforce the public’s right to the proper execution of city charter 
removal provisions, regardless of any private or personal benefit he may have gained.  State ex rel. 
Cater v. North Olmsted, 631 N.E.2d 1048, 1055 (Ohio 1994). 
180 Newell, 122 N.E.2d at 107. 
181 State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1111 (Ohio 1999) 
(Pfeifer, J., concurring).   
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V.  PUBLIC INTEREST STANDING IN SELECT STATES: CHARACTER OF THE 
LITIGANT AS BASIS FOR JUSTICIABILITY 
The states discussed in Part IV illustrated the first key factor—the 
character of the issue—in the determination of whether to grant or deny 
standing to non-Hohfeldian litigants.182  Similarly, the states in Part V—
Utah and Alaska—focus on a number of factors in determining whether to 
grant standing in public actions, including both the character of the issue 
and the character of the litigant.183  These two states are highlighted here 
because they aptly illustrate the second key factor—the character of the 
litigant.  These courts’ public interest standing doctrines address the 
question of whether the plaintiff is the best litigant to proceed with a given 
challenge, and if not, whether such constitutional or public issue would go 
unchallenged if such plaintiff is denied standing.  Moreover, the cases 
focus on the capacity of the plaintiff to show some connection to the issue 
and the competence with which such plaintiff can advocate on behalf of the 
public.184  As with the state courts which base their standing determinations 
on the character of the issue, these state courts must balance competing 
interests and address separation of powers considerations, and thus their 
respective doctrines are flexible and implemented on a case-by-case basis. 
A.  Utah: Public Interest “Alternative” Standing Test 
In its public interest “alternative” standing test, Utah recognizes public 
interest standing in the absence of traditional injury standing in cases 
where the plaintiff is an “appropriate party” and where the issues asserted 
are “of sufficient public importance to balance the absence of the 
traditional standing criteria.”185   
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that an “appropriate party,” for 
purposes of standing under the alternative test, is one that has the “interest 
necessary to effectively assist the court in developing and reviewing all 
relevant legal and factual questions” and where the issues are not likely to 
be raised if the party is denied standing.186  Moreover, there may be more 
than one “appropriate party” in a given case, and thus the alternative 
standing test is such that a court does not determine which party is the most 
appropriate in comparison to any other, but rather, in the interests of 
justice, which parties are appropriate to facilitating a full and fair 
                                                                                                                          
182 See infra text accompanying notes 155–81. 
183 See infra Parts V.A, V.B. 
184 See Jaffe, supra note 18, at 1314 (“[E]ven in states which allow public actions, the plaintiff 
may be able to secure judicial intervention only if he can bring himself within the class of persons 
specially entitled to sue.”). 
185 Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 148 P.3d 960, 974 (Utah 2006) (citation 
omitted) [hereinafter Sierra Club I]. 
186 Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983).   
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adjudication of the dispute.187  The recognition that more than one party 
may be an appropriate one to litigate an issue serves the underlying 
purpose of the alternative standing test—“to ensure that relevant issues are 
raised by a party who can effectively address them.”188  To attend to the 
potential problem of an overburdened judiciary, the alternative standing 
test affords a court the discretion to require multiple parties raising similar 
issues to collaborate on their briefing.189 
“If the party is not an appropriate party, the court’s inquiry ends and 
standing is denied.”190  However, if the “appropriate party” requirement is 
met, the court then considers whether the issue is of “sufficient public 
importance in and of [itself]” to warrant a grant of standing.191  This 
determination requires that the court, in its discretion, regard the issue as 
being of sufficient constitutional significance and that it would not be more 
appropriately addressed by either the legislative or executive branch of 
government through the political process.192 
In Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board 
(“Sevier”), the Utah Supreme Court granted the Sierra Club and other 
environmental organizations standing under both the traditional and 
alternative standing tests.193  The Sierra Club sought review of the Utah Air 
Quality Board’s denial of its petition objecting to the Utah Division of Air 
Quality’s permit authorizing the expansion of a power plant.194  The court 
held that as an environmental group concerned about the expansion of the 
plant, the Sierra Club was an “appropriate party” for purposes of the 
alternative test because it had the requisite interest to effectively aid the 
court in developing and analyzing the relevant legal and factual 
questions.195  More specifically, as an entity committed to the protection of 
the environment, the Sierra Club and its members were held to have had an 
interest in ensuring that the development and operation of the plant comply 
with all the applicable environmental laws and administrative procedures 
related to the plant’s expansion in order to prevent illegal pollution or 
                                                                                                                          
187 See Sierra Club I, 148 P.3d at 972–73 (“[T]he notion that a court must find the most 
appropriate party . . . is unnecessary and counter-productive.  We think that in many cases . . . there will 
be more than one party interested in the outcome of the case who can effectively raise issues that would 
otherwise escape review.”) (emphasis in original).   
188 Id. at 973. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 974. 
191 Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150. 
192 Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 148 P.3d 960, 973 (Utah 2006) (“The 
more generalized the issues, the more likely they ought to be resolved in the legislative or executive 
branches.”). 
193 Id. at 972.  In a case issued concurrently with Sevier, the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
Sierra Club had standing under both the traditional and alternative standing tests to challenge the 
expansion of the Intermountain Power Plant.  Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality 
Board, 148 P.3d 975, 982 (Utah 2006) [hereinafter Sierra Club II]. 
194 Sierra Club II, 148 P.3d at 979. 
195 Sierra Club I, 148 P.3d at 974 (citing Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150).   
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environmental degradation.196  Underscoring the fact that under the 
alternative standing test more than one litigant can be an appropriate party 
in a particular case, the court held that although another litigant, Citizens’ 
Group—which comprised a large group of Sevier County citizens who 
lived near the proposed plant site—was an appropriate party in Sevier, that 
fact did not alter the Sierra Club’s status as an appropriate party; its 
contribution to the litigation did not duplicate that of the Citizens’ Group 
but rather presented its own distinct issues and perspective.197 
Regarding the alternative standing test’s second inquiry—that is, 
whether the issue was of sufficient public importance to warrant a grant of 
standing—the court in Sevier held that the issue of whether the plant 
proposal complied with all applicable federal and state environmental laws 
was, in fact, an issue of “significant public importance.”198  Moreover, 
given the plant’s propensity for emitting hazardous chemicals and its 
proximity to homes and recreational areas, the court determined that the 
Sierra Club’s request for compliance of federal and state law was best 
addressed by the judicial branch of government since the legislative and 
executive branches had already addressed such issues in passing the federal 
Clean Air Act.199   
Sevier offers the most comprehensible articulation by Utah’s judiciary 
of its alternative public interest standing test.  Because the plaintiffs were 
granted standing under the traditional standing test, it appears as though the 
court’s cogent discussion of the alternative test was dicta.  The fact that the 
court discussed at length the alternative test despite the plaintiffs having 
passed muster under the traditional model shows the significance of the 
alternative test in the court’s jurisprudence.  The court might also have 
detailed the alternative test, which has evolved over the years, so as to 
address any confusion or inconsistencies regarding its application by lower 
courts.   
In D.A.R. v. State, the Utah Appellate Court denied standing under the 
alternative test.200  The case involved a challenge by a citizen who admitted 
engaging in conduct that violated the state’s sodomy and fornication 
statutes—though he had never been prosecuted for such violations—
requesting a declaratory judgment that the statutes were “null and void.”201  
The court held that the plaintiff failed both prongs of the alternative 
standing test because he was not an appropriate party to bring the case and 
the issue he raised was not of sufficient public importance to warrant a 
                                                                                                                          
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 972, 974 (citation omitted). 
199 Id. at 974–75. 
200 D.A.R. v. State, 133 P.3d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). 
201 Id. at 446–47.   
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grant of standing.202   
Regarding the question of whether the plaintiff—who had not been 
formally charged with any offense under the sodomy statutes—was an 
appropriate party to litigate the issue of the constitutionality of such 
statutes, the court noted that those individuals whom the state had actually 
charged with sodomy faced a greater risk under the statutes, and therefore 
had a “‘greater stake in the resolution of the issue.’”203  Thus, it was these 
potential litigants, rather than the plaintiff, who could more effectively aid 
the court in “developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual 
questions.”204  Accordingly, the court determined that the issue was, in 
fact, likely to be raised by such potential litigants even if the plaintiff was 
denied standing.205 
The court in D.A.R. also held that the issue raised was not of sufficient 
public import to warrant a grant of standing to the plaintiff since the state 
seldom enforced the sodomy and fornication statutes; in the rare instances 
where the state had used the statutes, there were no intimations of a 
systemic problem requiring judicial intervention.206  The court concluded 
that because the alleged injury to the plaintiff was of an abstract nature, it 
must be widespread among the public for the issue involved to be of 
sufficient public concern to meet the demands of the alternative standing 
test.207   
Thus, although non-Hohfeldian litigants in public interest actions are 
given a second chance at standing under Utah’s alternative standing test, 
such litigants might still be denied standing if the court finds that other 
litigants can better serve the public interest.  The court showed restraint in 
D.A.R., proving that when applied properly, Utah’s alternative standing test 
adequately balances the competing interests involved in the public action 
context: on one side, the vindication of the public interest and the need for 
a check on government illegalities; and, on the other side, the conservation 
of judicial resources and the need for a proper separation of powers 
between the branches of government. 
B.  Alaska: Citizen-Taxpayer Standing for Issues of “Public Significance” 
Through its common law, Alaska has developed an alternative 
standing test in addition to its traditional injury standing test that can be 
invoked in cases involving challenges made by litigants, in their capacity 
                                                                                                                          
202 Id. at 449–50. 
203 Id. at 450 (citation omitted). 
204 Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983). 
205 See D.A.R., 133 P.3d at 450 (stating that the court will “‘await a more appropriate 
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as citizens or taxpayers, who raise issues of “public significance.”208  To 
establish citizen-taxpayer standing, a plaintiff must meet two requirements: 
first, the issue presented to the court must be one of “public significance,” 
which Alaskan courts interpret broadly to include most constitutional 
issues;209 second, the plaintiff must be an “appropriate party” to bring the 
case, meaning he or she is “a true and strong adversary, even if the conduct 
in question did not directly affect [him or her].”210   
Signifying commonality with the test of appropriateness in Utah’s 
public interest standing system,211 Alaskan courts determine whether a 
plaintiff is an “appropriate party” for the sake of citizen-taxpayer standing 
using three key factors: first, “the plaintiff must not be a ‘sham plaintiff’ 
with no true adversity of interest”;212 second, the plaintiff “must be capable 
of competently advocating his or her position”;213 and third, there must not 
be a plaintiff more directly affected by the challenged conduct who has or 
is likely to litigate the issue.214  Regarding the third factor—whether a 
party more directly affected has or is likely to bring suit on the issue at 
hand—the Alaskan Supreme Court has noted that the “mere possibility” 
that such other party might bring suit does not necessitate a denial of 
standing to the plaintiff in the instant case.215  Thus, a court will grant 
standing to a plaintiff who can advocate his position competently and is 
adequately represented even where a non-litigant party might have more at 
stake in the outcome of the dispute.216 
Noting that standing in Alaska is “interpreted broadly” and that the 
state’s courts have “an approach favoring increased accessibility to judicial 
forums,”217 the Alaska Supreme Court granted citizen-taxpayer standing to 
                                                                                                                          
208 Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422, 428 (Alaska 1998).   
209 See id. (“A plaintiff who raises constitutional issues is likely to meet this requirement [of 
public significance].”). 
210 Id. 
211 See supra notes 186–89 and accompanying text.  
212 Baxley, 958 P.2d at 428.  In one case applying citizen-taxpayer standing, the Alaska Supreme 
Court stated that an example of a “sham plaintiff” is a party “whose intent is to lose the lawsuit and 
thus create judicial precedent upholding the challenged action.”  Trs. for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324, 
329 (Alaska 1987). 
213 Baxley, 958 P.2d at 428.  This adversity requirement is similar to the requirement in Utah’s 
alternative standing test that a plaintiff has “the interest necessary to effectively assist the court in 
developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual questions.”  Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 
1150 (Utah 1983).  Moreover, there is no clear evidence that a non-Hohfeldian plaintiff is any less 
capable than traditional plaintiffs at adequately representing a collective, public interest.  In fact, these 
plaintiffs may even represent such interests better than traditional plaintiffs.  See, e.g., Hershkoff, supra 
note 4, at 1936 (“[A] traditional Hohfeldian plaintiff, focusing on his own distinct injury, may distort 
the court’s construction of a full and fair record on public law issues that have important radiating 
effects.”); Segall, supra note 47, at 369 (“[I]deological, public interest plaintiffs who do not suffer 
personal injury often present more concrete adverseness and better developed records than traditional 
plaintiffs.”). 
214 Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422, 428 (Alaska 1998) (citing Trs. for Alaska, 736 P.2d at 329). 
215 Id. at 429. 
216 Id. 
217 Trs. for Alaska, 736 P.2d at 327 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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a coalition of environmental, Native, and fishing groups in Trustees for 
Alaska v. State.218  The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment 
challenging the state’s mineral leasing system as a violation of the Alaska 
Statehood Act’s mineral leasing requirement.219  Addressing whether the 
case presented an issue of public significance, the court held that public 
interest in the environmental protection of mineral resources in land 
selected from the federal government under the Statehood Act was of 
sufficient public importance to grant standing.220  In support of the court’s 
determination that the case presented an issue of public significance, it 
noted that, should the plaintiffs prevail, the state would have to alter its 
method of making state land available for mining, subsequently affecting 
approximately 50,000 existing mining claims.221  The court also cited the 
plaintiffs’ allegations that the state was illegally giving up more than 
$100,000 yearly in royalties under the current system, and that the state 
was at risk of forfeiting vast areas of state lands to the United States.222  
The court found that the plaintiffs were appropriate parties to bring the 
suit, and noted that the plaintiffs were well-represented by competent 
counsel who zealously presented their position.223  The court also held that 
the litigants were not “sham plaintiffs;” they clearly possessed sincerity in 
their opposition to the state’s mineral disposition system.  Additionally, 
there were no other actual or potential litigants who might be more directly 
interested in the validity of the state’s system.224  In making this 
determination, the court stated that the critical issue was whether the more 
directly interested potential plaintiff—the Attorney General—had sued or 
seemed likely to sue in the foreseeable future, rather than simply whether 
he might sue at some unknown point in the future.225  The Attorney 
General had not sued, and there were no indications that he planned to, so 
the court held that the plaintiffs satisfied Alaska’s test for citizen-taxpayer 
standing and thus were appropriate parties to bring suit in the case.226   
While a federal court might have left the issue to the political process, 
the Alaskan judiciary demonstrated its active role in the vindication of the 
public interest.  Though the court ultimately granted citizen-taxpayer 
standing, the step-by-step analysis it took exhibits its cautious approach in 
these cases.  This demonstrates that, as with New Mexico, Ohio, and Utah, 
                                                                                                                          
218 Id. at 330. 
219 Id. at 326–27.  More specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the state had incorrectly interpreted 
restrictions to apply only to lands known to contain minerals at the time of the state selection and had 
failed to require royalty or rent payments in leases of lands.  Id. at 332. 
220 Id. at 330. 
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the judiciary in Alaska has developed a workable doctrine that provides the 
courts with an active role in the adjudication of public actions without 
simultaneously disrupting the balance of powers within the state 
governance structure. 
Similarly, in Sonneman v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court granted 
citizen-taxpayer standing to a litigant who challenged the constitutionality 
of a statutory amendment.227  This statutory amendment terminated the 
practice of rotating the order of candidates’ names on election ballots, 
replacing it with a random selection of the order of candidates’ names.228  
The court first held that the constitutional issues involved—the plaintiff’s 
fundamental right to vote in his capacity as a citizen of the state, and the 
integrity and fairness of public elections—were of sufficient public 
significance to pass muster under the first inquiry of the citizen-taxpayer 
standing test.229  The court then held that the citizen was an “appropriate 
party” to bring the suit.  The court found that the citizen-taxpayer had 
preserved his constitutional arguments on appeal; that he was a competent 
advocate to challenge the constitutionality of the statutory amendment; that 
the parties were truly adverse; and finally, that there was no evidence that 
anyone who might be more directly affected by the statutory amendment 
was in the process of challenging it.230   
As with Trustees for Alaska, the court in Sonneman granted standing in 
a case that might have been best left to the political process.  However, the 
court has also shown restraint by refusing to apply citizen-taxpayer 
standing in the public action context.  For example, the court denied 
citizen-taxpayer standing in Ruckle v. Anchorage School District, a case in 
which it refused to grant standing to a taxpayer challenging the state’s 
bidding process for school bus transportation contracts.231  The denial of 
standing turned on the fact that Laidlaw, the former school bus service 
provider for the district which had been outbid by another bus provider, 
was more directly affected by the challenged conduct and had already filed 
a nearly identical suit.232  The court stated that although a plaintiff, in his or 
her capacity as a citizen and taxpayer of the state, might be an appropriate 
party in a public bidding case, because Laidlaw had already raised 
“similar, if not identical” claims against the school district in its lawsuit, 
                                                                                                                          
227 Sonneman v. State, 969 P.2d 632, 634 (Alaska 1998).   
228 Id. at 636; see also Coghill v. Boucher, 511 P.2d 1297, 1304 (Alaska 1973) (granting citizen-
taxpayer to registered voters challenging certain proposed vote-counting procedures, because, as the 
court noted, “a retreat to restrictive notions of standing . . . would not advance the public’s vital interest 
in maintenance of the integrity of vote-tallying procedures during statewide elections.  Denial of 
standing . . . would have the effect of unduly limiting the possibility of a popular check upon executive 
control of the election process”). 
229 Sonneman, 969 P.2d at 636. 
230 Id. 
231 Ruckle v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 85 P.3d 1030, 1037 (Alaska 2004). 
232 Id. 
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allowing Ruckle to proceed with her claims would be “unnecessarily 
duplicative” and would waste judicial resources.233   
Much like other state courts that utilize some permutation of a public 
interest standing test, the court in Ruckle demonstrated the caution by 
which Alaska’s courts grant citizen-taxpayer standing, applying a case-by-
case approach and a balancing of the competing values of judicial restraint 
and economy on the one side, and the need for the vindication of the public 
interest on the other.  By exhibiting restraint in applying public interest 
standing models, state courts avoid the problems of flooding litigation and 
drained judicial resources that critics often cite.234   
As a result of the inherent differences between the federal and state 
judicial systems, discussed in Part III, the state system is more hospitable 
to public interest standing than its federal counterpart.  The state public 
interest models discussed in Parts IV and V demonstrate both the successes 
and the challenges that arise in states that utilize doctrines which allow for 
increased judicial access to non-Hohfeldian litigants.  Though such 
doctrines are unlikely to penetrate federal court jurisprudence, they have 
proven to be effective mechanisms in the states for providing judicial 
review of constitutional or statutory provisions that might otherwise be 
unreviewable. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of standing is an amorphous, complex, judge-made 
system by which courts impose restrictions on who can access the judiciary 
for the adjudication of claims and grievances of both a personal and public 
nature.  In the 2007 Term in Hein, the United States Supreme Court 
continued its trend of limiting standing in the realm of citizen and taxpayer 
suits aimed at vindicating the public interest.235  The strict, injury-based 
standing model that permeates the federal courts is not adhered to by many 
states, which have created their own unique systems of standing to address 
issues of constitutional importance.  The public interest standing doctrines 
discussed demonstrate the states’ commitment to ensuring that 
constitutional limitations on governmental power are judicially enforced, 
while simultaneously limiting such review to public actions where it is 
absolutely necessary to protect the collective rights of the citizenry.  The 
existence of these various state models demonstrates the difference in the 
philosophy between these states’ courts and the federal courts as to the 
                                                                                                                          
233 Id. 
234 See Hershkoff, supra note 4, at 1935 (“State courts are well placed to assess governance needs 
and to adapt judicial access rules, given existing resources and other limitations.  State courts can also 
use ancillary devices to deal with caseload concerns . . . [including using] their administrative power to 
screen patently frivolous cases from the system . . . .”). 
235 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 127 U.S. 2553, 2555–56 (2007).  
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judiciary’s place in a democratic system of government and its role in the 
vindication of the public interest.   
 
